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Abstract:  China’s average household saving rate is one of the highest in the 
world. One popular view attributes the high saving rate to fast rising housing prices 
and other costs of living in China. This article uses simple economic logic to show 
that  rising housing prices and living costs  per se cannot explain China’s  high 
household saving rate. Although borrowing constraints and demographic changes can 
help translate housing prices to the aggregate saving rate, quantitative simulations 
using Chinese data on household income, housing prices, and demographics indicate 
that  rising  mortgage costs  contribute  at most 5 percentage points to the  Chinese 
aggregate  household saving rate, given the down-payment structure of China’s 
mortgage markets. 
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1  Introduction 
According to Friedman’s (1957) permanent  income  hypothesis,  rational 
consumers should save less when their income is growing faster, because the need to 
save is reduced when people expect to be richer in the future than they are today. 
However, the reality in China is the opposite: As one of the fastest-growing 
economies, China’s average household saving rate is among the highest in the world. 
Aggregate  household saving rate is defined in this paper as  the ratio of net 
changes  in  aggregate  household  financial wealth  (e.g., bank deposits, government 
















































































































































































  Figure 1 shows that 
the average Chinese household saving rate was around 2% in 1978 (the starting year 
of economic reform) and rose rapidly thereafter. The saving rate stabilized around 
20% to 25% after the early 1990s and peaked in 1994 and 2003 with values of 27% 
and 26%, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Chinese Household Saving Rate (1978-2006)
 2
Such a high  aggregate household saving rate is extraordinary compared with 
 
                                                                 
1  Notice that our definition of the saving rate does not include changes in household nonfinancial 
wealth (such as housing investment). 
2  Data source: Bai and Qian (2009). 3 
 
developed nations such as the United States, which has had an average household 
saving rate of 2% since the early 1990s (Figure 2).
  3  However, the high Chinese 
saving rate may not be unique. Figure 2 also shows the household saving rates for 
Japan from 1968 to 1976 and Korea from 1983 to 1991 when these two economies 
experienced  similar  economic growth and  had  household saving rates  similar  to 
China.
4
Why the Japanese saved so much during the  rapid stage of economic 
development is still an  open  question  (see,  e.g.,  Hayashi, 1986).  Hence,  it is not 
surprising hat the high Chinese saving rate appears puzzling, especially given China’s 
rapid income growth. 













































United States Japan Korea China Korea (1983-1991) Japan (1968-1976)
 
Figure 2. Cross-Country Comparison of Household Saving Rates (1998-2006) 
 
The  high saving rate of Chinese households not only poses  a challenge to 
economic theory, but also has become a source of recent political controversy and 
                                                                 
3  Data source: OECD Economic Outlook 1985 database, Hayashi (1986), and Bai and Qian (2009). 
4  We are unable to find reliable household saving data for India. However, according to a report from the Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy, India’s household saving rate in 2001 was 24%, including investment in 
nonfinancial wealth. This number rose to 34.8% in 2007, 36% in 2008, and was expected to be 24% in 2009. 
Based on such information, India’s household saving rate has reached a level similar to China’s.   4 
 
trade disputes with the United States and other major trading partners of China. For 
example, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, alleged that 
the  high  Chinese saving rate was the culprit of the recent American subprime 
mortgage crisis because it caused low interest rates in the world financial markets, 
which pushed Americans toward excessive consumption and housing finance.
5
What are the causes of the high Chinese saving rate? A growing literature has 
attempted to understand this phenomenon and many factors have been proposed as 
possible  causes, including rapid income growth,  aging  population, lack of social 
safety nets and unemployment insurance,  precautionary saving motives, cultural 
tradition of thrift, high costs of education and health care, and rising housing prices, 
among others.
   
6
Indeed, the rapidly rising housing prices and other costs of living (such as 
education and healthcare) in China have become serious socioeconomic problems and 
attracted  much  attention  from  the  news media  and policymakers.  In the cities  of 
Beijing and Shanghai, for example, the average housing price-to-income ratio (for a 
300-square-foot living space) is about 12.
  In particular, Wei and Zhang (2009) propose that the unbalanced sex 
ratio in China leads to competitive saving behavior in the marriage markets, which 
may  significantly raise  the  aggregate household saving rate  because  men  with 
adequate wealth accumulation (e.g., enough savings to buy houses) have a greater 
chance to attract marriage partners.  Such  competitive behavior further drives up 
housing prices and reinforces the competitive saving behavior. Chamon and Prasad 
(2010)  argue  that the rapidly rising private burden of  housing,  education,  and 
healthcare are the most important contributing factors. They also conjecture that the 
impact of these factors on saving can be amplified by underdeveloped financial and 
credit markets. 
7
                                                                 
5  From a speech by Alan Greenspan, “The Fed Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 
2009. 
  Namely, a young married couple needs to 
save their entire income (a 100% saving rate) for 12 years to afford a 600-square-foot 
6  This literature includes Modigliani and Cao (2004), Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000), Horioka and Wan 
(2007), Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2006), Yuan and Song (1999, 2000), and Wen (2009). 
7  According to the China Statistical Yearbook (2007), in 2006 the average living space per person was 27.1 square 
meters in urban areas and 30.7square meters in rural areas. However, the average living space for new homebuyers 
is greater than 30 square meters. 5 
 
apartment for their family.
8
Can rising housing prices really explain the high household saving rate in China? 
This is not only an empirical question,  but also a theoretical one  with broad 
implications for developing economies. To the best of our knowledge, little theoretical 
work has been done to carefully and quantitatively address this question. Based on 
simple economic logic and quantitative analysis, our answer to the above question is 
“No.”   
  This means that, even with bank loans with a one-third 
down-payment  arrangement  and  a  33%  household  saving rate, a typical working 
couple still needs to save for 12 years to buy a small apartment. Hence, it is not 
surprising that rising housing prices have been perceived as one of the most important 
factors underlying China’s high aggregate household saving rate.   
More specifically, we show the following: 
● In the absence of economic growth and borrowing constraints, the aggregate 
household saving rate of an economy is independent of housing prices. 
● Only under the following combined conditions—namely (i) agents are severely 
borrowing constrained  with zero  possibility of obtaining  mortgage  loans,  (ii)  the 
relative population of would-be homebuyers to homebuyers increases rapidly over 
time, and (iii)  housing prices rise much  faster than household  income—will  high 
housing prices significantly increase the aggregate household saving rate. However, 
these conditions are inconsistent with Chinese reality. Quantitative simulations based 
on Chinese time-series data for household income, housing prices, demographic 
structure, and mortgage down-payment requirement show that rising housing prices 
can contribute at most 5 percentage points to the aggregate saving rate. 
The intuition is simple: Suppose the only reason to save  is to buy a house. 
Regardless of the level of housing prices, income saved for future housing purchases 
by would-be homeowners is always canceled by housing expenditures of homebuyers 
in the measured aggregate saving ratio. In other words, as soon as a person spends his 
                                                                 
8  According to China Statistical Yearbook (2008), in 2007 the nationwide average housing price was 3,645 yuan 
per square meter, 10,661 yuan for Beijing and 8,253 yuan for Shanghai. In 2007, the average disposable income 
per capita was 13,786 yuan nationwide, 21,989 yuan in Beijing and 23,623 yuan in Shanghai. Hence, if the living 
space per person is 30 square meters, the housing price-to-disposable income ratio would be 7.93 for the nation, 
14.55 for Beijing, and 10.48 for Shanghai. 6 
 
or  her past savings to purchase a good, the  average lifetime saving rate  for that 
individual immediately becomes zero. If part of the expenditure is financed by bank 
loans  against  the buyer’s  future income, the  average  lifetime  saving rate at the 
moment of the home purchase is even negative because the buyer must continue to 
save in the future to repay the loans until the debt is completely repaid. Hence, if the 
population is not growing and housing prices are constant, the aggregate saving rate 
across all cohorts at any point in time is independent of housing prices, regardless of 
borrowing constraints.   
On the other hand, if housing prices are rapidly growing, then the population 
share of would-be homebuyers  is effectively increasing relative to that of the 
homebuyers.  In this case, the expenditures of the homebuyers cannot completely 
cancel the savings of the would-be homebuyers. Because young cohorts need to save 
more and for longer periods under  borrowing constraints when housing prices 
increase, this is equivalent to a continuous expansion of the population size of the 
saving cohort relative to the dissaving cohort.  In other words, both housing-price 
growth and borrowing constraints are equivalent to population growth in terms of 
their impact on the aggregate saving rate. We call such equivalence the “population 
effect”  in this paper.  Under  such population effects, housing prices may play an 
important role in determining the aggregate saving rate. However,  if household 
income increases at roughly the same rate as that of housing prices (as is the case in 
China), then the anticipated rising permanent income would reduce the need to save 
and cancels the population effects. In fact, the rapid growth in household income is 
the most important driving force behind the rapidly rising housing prices in China. 
Therefore, our analysis clarifies a popular confusion or misunderstanding that 
attributes the high aggregate household saving rate in China to rising housing prices 
and other costs of living. The same logic can also be applied to discredit similar 
theories that view the rising private burden in education, childbearing, healthcare, 
marriage, and so on in China as the key contributing factors to China’s high aggregate 
household saving rate. 
Our analysis also reveals a potential tension between survey data and economic 7 
 
analysis. Suppose survey data unambiguously indicate that living-cost factors are the 
primary motive for each household to increase its saving rate. Such empirical facts by 
no means imply that rising living costs  are responsible for the  persistently  high 
aggregate household saving rate—because incomes saved for any spending needs will 
always be consumed at later stages of life. Hence, such types of savings will    cancel 
across households among different cohorts. Even if savings are not entirely spent 
within a person’s lifetime and become bequests, they would reduce the children’s 
need to save by exactly the same amount. Thus, any such type of savings should be 
canceled through aggregation across age cohorts.   
Hayashi’s (1986) article, “Why Is Japan’s Saving Rate So Apparently High?” 
analyzes the possible causes of Japan’s high household saving rate in the 1960-70s. 
His analysis includes discussions regarding the possible impact of rising housing 
prices on Japanese household saving behavior. In particular, using regression analysis, 
he  found that the average household saving rate of a  given  Japanese  city is 
independent of that city’s average housing prices.
9
In this paper, we choose a simple consumption-saving model to illustrate our 
points, yet without the loss of generality.  In the model, many variables (such as 
household  income, housing prices, the optimal  age of homebuyers, and the 
demographic structure) are deliberately kept exogenous so that comparative statistics 
  Based on this finding, Hayashi 
concludes that rising housing prices per se are not the cause of Japan’s high household 
saving rate because of the “saving-expenditure cancellation” effects across population 
and cohorts. This conclusion is similar to ours. However, Hayashi did not conduct 
detailed theoretical analysis to rigorously prove the point, so his analysis is not 
generalizable  and may not apply to China. In particular,  he did not consider the 
possibility that under severe borrowing constraints rising housing prices may 
significantly increase the aggregate household saving rate.   
                                                                 
9  Hayashi also estimated the saving rates of homeowners, would-be homebuyers, and non-homeowners who do 
not plan to own houses in rural and urban areas, respectively. He argued that if housing prices have significant 
impact on a household’s saving rate, then the saving rate of would-be homebuyers should be significantly higher 
than the other two types of households, and urban households should have a higher saving rate than rural 
households. But he did not find such differences in the Japanese data. 8 
 
can be easily conducted  using Chinese data.  The only endogenous optimization 
behavior derived from the model is consumption smoothing over a person’s lifetime 
subject to borrowing constraints.  This framework provides  the  simplest  setup to 
calibrate the model using various Chinese time-series data. 
The  remainder  of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
benchmark consumption-saving model without borrowing constraints and studies the 
effects of housing prices on aggregate household saving rate. Section 3 extends the 
analysis to borrowing constraints. Sections 4 and 5 conduct robustness analysis and 
consider other extensions of the basic model. Section 6 concludes the paper with some 
policy recommendations. 
2  The Basic Model 
2.1   Constant Income and Housing Prices 
Suppose shelter (housing) is an indivisible and  necessary consumption good. 
Given income, increases in housing prices will force individual consumers to save 
more (and for a longer period) to afford a house. This positive association between 
housing prices and individual saving behavior may be why people view rising housing 
prices as a cause of the high aggregate saving rate in China. However, this view 
suffers from the fallacy of aggregation: It ignores the fact that when people purchase 
houses, they generate negative savings to society, canceling other people’s positive 
savings.   
More  specifically, suppose that (i)  the interest rate is zero and there is no 
discounting in the future,
10
                                                                 
10  Our results are robust to these assumptions. 
  (ii) each individual’s only purpose for saving at a young 
age is to buy a house in middle age, and there are no debts or bequests at birth or after 
death. Clearly, in such a society each person’s average lifetime saving rate should be 
exactly zero. Although a higher housing price will increase an individual’s saving rate 
before purchasing a house, it does not change the average lifetime saving rate because 
at the moment of home purchase,  all of the buyer’s positive savings are exactly 9 
 
canceled by the current expenditure. Therefore, if the population is stable over time 
(i.e., each age cohort has the same number of individuals), then the aggregate saving 
rate is also zero, independent of housing prices. 
Formally, imagine an economy where all agents have the same momentary utility 
function, and a typical consumer lives for  T   periods with a constant income flow  Y  
in each period. The consumer needs to buy a house in period  1 tT +≤ ,
11
MY >
  the price of 
a house is  ,  and there are no borrowing constraints except the zero-debt 
requirement at the end of life. Naturally, we also need to assume  TY M >   to ensure 
that each consumer is able to afford a house with his or her lifetime income. Under 
these conditions, because of the zero interest rate and no discounting, the marginal 
utility of consumption (C ) is exactly the same across time, so utility maximization 
implies that the consumer will save a constant amount of his or her personal income 
flow each period to smooth consumption. 










C M TY τ
τ
−≤ ∑ . 
Notice that we have deliberately omitted housing consumption in the utility function 
to simplify the analysis. This is an innocuous assumption because shelter is a 
necessary consumption good and the wealth effect generated from a house, if exists, 
will only decrease the incentive for saving rather than increase  it.  The  optimal 





τ = −  
That is, consumption is perfectly smoothed and equals a constant. However, notice 
that the total expenditure in period  1 t +   equals consumption  plus the housing 
                                                                 
11  Because  t  can take arbitrary values, we can calibrate it using Chinese data. Making it endogenous complicates 
the analysis dramatically without additional gains. An additional advantage of keeping  t  exogenous is that we 
need not worry about how and when housing enters the utility function. That is, we can ignore the utility value of 
housing without loss of generality. 10 
 
expenditure:  1 t CM + + . This typical consumer’s expenditure, savings, and saving rate 
in each period of his/her lifetime are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Individual Consumer’s Saving Behavior 
Period  1  …  t  t+1  t+2  …  T 
Expenditure  Y MT −   …  Y MT −   Y MT M −+   Y MT −   …  Y MT −  






















The first row of Table 1 indicates the consumer’s living period (or age), the 
second row total expenditures in each period, the third row additional savings in each 
period, and the last row saving rate in each period, which is defined as the ratio of 
additional savings to income.   
Notice that the consumer’s saving rate is always 
M
TY
  in each period except in 
period  1 t + . In period  1 t + , because of the additional spending on the  housing 
purchase,  the  saving rate is negative,  0
MM
TY Y
−< .  The consumer’s average  lifetime 
saving rate is given by 
1
Life-time Average Saving Rate 0
T MM
TY Y τ =
= −= ∑ .  (1) 
Because the negative savings incurred at the moment of a home purchase exactly 
cancel the other periods’  positive savings, housing prices are irrelevant to the 
consumer’s lifetime saving rate. 
To compute the aggregate household saving rate in this economy with many 
different age cohorts for a particular period, we need to aggregate the saving rate of 
each age cohort in that  period. There exist two measures (or definitions)  of  the 
aggregate saving rate: 
(i)  The average of the  personal saving rate across cohorts weighted by the 








=∑ ,  (2) 







=   represents the saving rate of cohort  τ .   



















,  (3) 
where  τ α   still denotes the population share of cohort  τ ,  Sτ   denotes the savings of 
cohort  τ , and  Y τ   the income of cohort  τ . 
  We can call definition (i) the average household saving rate and definition (ii) the 
aggregate household saving rate. Clearly, if all cohorts have the same income levels 
and  identical  population shares, the two definitions are equivalent. However, if 
different cohorts have different income levels and population shares (e.g., because of 
income growth and population growth), the two measures of the aggregate saving rate 
are not identical. Because definition (ii) depends only on macro data and is consistent 
with the data presented in Figures 1 and 2, we adopt definition (ii) in equation (3) as 
the measure of the aggregate household saving rate for use throughout the rest of this 
paper. 
Assume for a moment identical population shares across cohorts (we will relax 
this assumption in the next section);  then 
1
T
τ α =   in equation (3).  In this case, 
because income and housing prices are time invariant, we can compute the aggregate 





















 = = =
∑ ∑
∑∑
.  (4) 
Namely, the aggregate saving rate is zero and independent of housing prices. 12 
 
  Hence, under the maintained assumptions of constant income and demographics, 
changes in the level of housing prices do not affect the aggregate saving rate, although 
they do affect individuals’ saving rates. In other words, even if 99% of the total 
population is saving for future home purchases, the other  1%  (homebuyers)  can 
generate just enough negative savings to cancel the would-be homebuyers’ positive 
savings, resulting in a zero aggregate saving rate. This logic of aggregation is simple 
but not always recognized. 
However, does the conclusion continue to hold if income and housing prices 
grow over time? In a sense, continuously rising housing prices imply that young 
cohorts must continuously increase their saving rate and save for a longer period to 
afford a house. Consequently, the relative population share of the would-be 
homebuyers will get larger than that of homebuyers (even without population growth) 
and  this population effect  may result in a  higher aggregate saving rate, holding 
income constant. On the other hand, if income is also growing over time, the effective 
size of the would-be homebuyers relative to homebuyers will shrink because the need 
to save is reduced (a negative population effect), everything else equal. Therefore, if 
income and housing prices are growing at the same time, their population effects may 
(at least partially) cancel each other, leading to insignificant changes in the aggregate 
saving rate. This issue is the focus of the next subsection. 
2.2   Time-Varying Income and Housing Prices 
In a model with time-varying income and housing prices, a consumer born in 






τ = ∑  
1
=1 =1
s.t.:   .
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t CM Y ττ
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+ +≤ ∑∑  






+ = −  13 
 








= ∑  
denotes  a consumer’s permanent income  (i.e., average lifetime income). Total 
expenditure in period  1 t +   is  1 t CM + + . 
Suppose the optimal age for each consumer to become a homeowner is  1 t +  
periods after birth. Suppose at the present moment this cohort of homebuyers faces 
housing price  0 M   and has permanent income  0 Y . We call this age group “cohort 
1 t + .”  Based on such notations, the  generation  one  period younger than the 
homebuyer cohort is called “cohort  t,” who will become homebuyers in the next 
period and face  housing price  1 M   and permanent income  1 Y .  Analogously, the 
generation one period older than the homebuyers is called “cohort  2 t + ,” who have 
already bought a house one period ago when the  housing price was  1 M−   and 
permanent income was  1 Y − . By the same token, at the present moment all generations 
younger than the homebuyers are called cohorts  { } 1, 2, ,t  , respectively, and these 
would-be homebuyers will face housing prices  11 { , ,..., } tt MM M −   and permanent 
income  11 { , ,..., } tt YY Y − , respectively. Also, at the moment all generations older than 
the homebuyers are called cohorts { } 2, 3, , tt T ++  , respectively, and these 
homeowners once bought a house with prices  12 1 { , ,..., } Tt MM M − − − +−   and permanent 
income  12 1 { , ,..., } Tt YY Y − − − +−   in the past.   
Based on the above notations, we can tabulate the incomes, savings, and saving 
rates of different age cohorts at the present moment. The first row in Table 2 shows 
the age of different cohorts at the present moment, the second row their respective 
permanent income levels, the third row the housing prices they face when becoming a 
homeowner, the fourth row their current level of savings, and the last row their 
respective saving rate at the present moment. The table shows that at the same time 14 
 
point different age cohorts have different saving rates because permanent income and 
housing prices are changing over time.  However, regardless of age cohort, the 
saving rate of each cohort is a function of the housing price-to-income ratio (MY ) 
facing that particular cohort. 
 
Table 2. Saving Behavior of Different Age Cohorts 
Age Cohort  1  …  t  t+1  t+2  …  T 
Permanent 
Income 
t Y   …  1 Y   0 Y   1 Y −   …  1 Tt Y − ++ 
Housing 
Price 
t M   …  1 M   0 M   1 M−   …  1 Tt M− ++ 
Savings  t MT   …  1 MT   ( ) 0 1 TM
T
−


































  Therefore, if the price-to-income ratio  MY   remains constant over time despite 
growing housing prices and permanent income, then different age cohorts (except the 
homebuyer cohort) have the same saving rate, whereas the homebuyer cohort always 
has a negative saving rate. Hence, the average saving rate across cohorts is exactly 
zero because each cohort is weighted identically by the factor 1/T in computing the 
societal average saving rate.   
  However, because by definition the aggregate saving rate is the ratio of aggregate 
saving to aggregate income, instead of the weighted sum of individuals’ saving rates, 
the measured aggregate saving rate is not necessarily zero but depends on the current 
housing price-to-aggregate income ratio. That is,  the  negative savings of the 
homebuyer cohort (cohort  1 t + ) may receive a lower (or higher) weight than  1 T   if 
equation (3) is used as our measure of the aggregate saving rate. For example, if the 
ratio of cohort  1 t + ’s housing price ( 0 M ) to aggregate income equals  1 T , then the 15 
 
measured aggregate saving rate is still zero; however, if that ratio is greater than  1 T , 
then the measured aggregate saving rate is less than zero because the negative savings 
caused by the homebuyer cohort more than cancels  the total savings from other 
cohorts due to time-varying housing prices and income; and if that ratio is less than 
1 T , the measured aggregate saving rate is positive.   
To sort out these effects, consider first the case where permanent income and 
housing prices have constant growth rates according to the law of motion: 
( ) 1 1 Y aY ττ − = +   and  ( ) 1 1 M bM ττ − = + , respectively, where the growth rate  a  and 
b   are both constants. Notice that if annual income grows at a constant rate, then the 
permanent income also grows at the same constant rate. Under these conditions, the 





































.  (5) 
If  0 a ≠   and  0 b ≠ , equation (5) can be simplified to 


























 −+ +  −
−+
=
 −+  +
−+
, 
which depends only on the price-to-income ratio of the current homebuyer cohort. 
  For example, suppose  10% ab = = ,  T = 40, and  t= 15.
12
                                                                 
12 
  Then equation (5) 
gives an aggregate saving rate of 2.14%, which is trivial compared with the 20% 
Chinese aggregate saving rate. On the other hand, it is possible to obtain an aggregate 
saving rate of 20% in the model if we allow the growth rate of permanent income and 
housing prices to be 50% per year, which is hard to imagine in reality. Therefore, 
when housing prices and permanent income grow at the same rate, housing prices are 
still irrelevant to the aggregate saving rate.   
T = 40 and  t = 15 imply that each individual needs to work for 15 years to afford a house and work for 40 
years to retire (income is assumed to be zero after retirement). 16 
 
Calibration 1. We now use actual Chinese data to calibrate the model. Suppose 
that people start working at age 21 and retire at age 60; thus, we set the total working 
years  T = 40. Also suppose that the average homebuyer’s age is 35—that is, people 
must work and save for 15 years before buying a house. This implies that  t= 15 in 
our model (e.g., in  Table 2). Suppose that individuals in the homebuyer cohort 
(“cohort  1 t + ”) become homeowners in the year 2007;  in  that year the housing 
price-to-income ratio in China was 7.93, so we set  0 0 MY = 8. According to Chinese 
Statistical Yearbook (2008), from 1978 to 2007 the growth rate of average family 
income is 12.57% in rural areas and 13.58% in urban areas; hence we set  a= 0.13. 
According to Zhong Hong Macro Database, the average growth rate of housing prices 
was 9.02% per year between 1991 and 2008, hence we set  b = 0.09. Entering these 
numbers into equation (5), the estimated aggregate saving rate equals 1%. That is, 
rising housing prices explain only 1 percentage point of China’s aggregate household 
saving rate, substantially below the actual 27% saving rate in 2007.   
Moreover, even if the growth rate of housing prices exceeds that of income, the 
impact of rising housing prices on aggregate saving rate is still quite limited. For 
example, when the growth rate of household income is 10% per year, to reach an 
aggregate saving rate of 20% in the model, the average growth rate of housing prices 
must be almost 20% per year. Although a 20% annual growth rate in housing prices is 
possible for a short period, we have not seen such a high average growth rate over a 
10-year period in China or anywhere else in the world. 
Calibration 2. The above calibration analysis is based on the assumption that the 
growth rates of income and housing prices are constant over time. If we allow the 
growth rate of income and housing prices to vary over time, how does this affect our 
results? Because the simple model is no longer analytically tractable under uncertainty, 
we assume perfect foresight to gain intuition. When the growth rates of both income 
and housing prices are time varying, Table 2 implies that the aggregate household 























.  (6) 
As before, using 2007 as the base year for current homebuyers (cohort  1 t + ): 
0 2007 MP = , where  2007 P   denotes the average housing price in 2007. Recall that we 
use a 40-year window to compute the permanent income based on 40 years of average 
household income between year  2007 t −   and year  2007 1 Tt + −−, where T = 40. 












= ∑ . 
By the same method, we can also estimate the permanent incomes of cohorts 
{ } 1, 2, ,t    and cohorts { } 2, 3, , tt T ++  .
13
{ } 10 1 , ,, ,, t t Tt MM M M − − ++ 
  Entering  the estimated values of 
housing prices facing homebuyers of different age cohorts, 
,  and the corresponding permanent incomes 
{ } 10 1 , ,,,, t t Tt YY Y Y − − ++    into equation (6), we obtain an aggregate saving rate of 
0.61%.   
  Therefore, regardless of how the model is calibrated, we conclude that in the 
absence of borrowing constraints, rising housing prices cannot explain China’s 
aggregate household saving rate.   
3  Borrowing Constraints and Demographics 
The basic model in Section 2 makes two important assumptions: (i) Consumers 
can completely smooth their consumption over a working lifetime by using future 
income to finance current mortgage payments. (ii) The population or demographic 
structure does not change over time. These assumptions are not realistic and may bias 
our results.   
Assumption (i) would be innocuous if household income, housing prices, and 
                                                                 
13  Computing young cohorts’ permanent income needs to use income data after 2009. Since such data do not exist, 
we extrapolate by assuming a 10% annual growth rate after 2009. We provide the sensitivity analysis in Section 4. 18 
 
population were constant over time. To understand this, suppose consumers cannot 
borrow at all. Then cohort  1 t +   must increase its saving rate at a younger age to 
accumulate just enough money to pay off the entire mortgage before period  1 t + . 
Even in this case, if income and housing prices do not grow over time, the aggregate 
saving rate is still zero because the negative savings generated by cohort  1 t +   in the 
housing market still completely cancel the total positive savings from  cohorts 
{ } 1, 2, ,t  . 
However, if income and housing prices grow over time, assumption (i) is no 
longer innocuous and borrowing constraints may greatly magnify the positive impact 
of housing prices on the aggregate saving rate.   
The assumption of a constant population size does not allow our model to 
capture any transitional dynamics outside the steady state. Hence, considering the 
demographic structure is also important for the robustness of our analysis and 
conclusions. Formal analyses with the assumptions (i) and (ii) relaxed are presented 
below. We consider first the case with borrowing constraints (Section 3.1) and then 
consider the case with a time-varying population structure (Section 3.2). 
3.1   Borrowing Constraints 
To facilitate future analysis, we first consider constant income and housing prices 
under borrowing constraints. If agents cannot borrow at all, assuming that the optimal 
period for home purchase is still  1 t +   periods after birth (we examine the robustness 
of the results to this assumption later), would-be homebuyers must then increase their 
saving rates before period  1 t + . This implies that from period 1 to  t  the saving rate 
is  / Mt , optimal consumption is  Y Mt − . Between period  2 t +   and period  T , the 
optimal consumption level is Y   and the saving rate is zero. In period  1 t + , total 
expenditure (consumption plus housing purchase) is YM + . These statistics are 
summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Individual Saving Behavior under Borrowing Constraints 
(Constant Income and Housing Prices) 
Period  1  …  t  t+1  t+2  …  T 
Expenditure  Y Mt −   …  Y Mt −   YM +   Y   …  Y  











  0  …  0 
 
Compared with Table 1, borrowing constraints raise the individual’s saving rate 
from  MT   to  Mt ; however, the average lifetime saving rate is still zero. Hence, if 
the population share of each age cohort is the same, the aggregate saving rate is also 
zero.   
Now with time-varying income and housing prices, the effective share of each 
cohort is no longer the same because of the population effect. In this case, we can use 
a method similar to that used for Table 2 to compute each age cohort’s saving rate 
under borrowing constraints. The results are summarized in Table 4. 
 
  Table 4. Saving Behavior of Different Cohorts under Borrowing Constraints 
(Time-Varying Income and Housing Prices) 
Age Cohort  1  …  t  t+1  t+2  …  T 
Permanent 
Income 
t Y   …  1 Y   0 Y   1 Y −   …  1 Tt Y − ++ 
Housing 
Price 
t M   …  1 M   0 M   1 M−   …  1 Tt M− ++ 

















  0   …  0  
 
Each generation purchases houses  1 t +   periods after birth. In a particular 
moment, the current homebuyer generation is called cohort  1 t + ,  and this cohort 20 
 
faces housing price  0 M   and permanent income  0 Y . The one-period-younger 
generation is called cohort  t, this cohort will be buying houses in the next period, 
facing housing price  1 M   and permanent income  1 Y , and this generation’s current 
saving rate is  1 Mt . Analogously, the one-period-older generation is called cohort 
2 t + , these individuals have already bought houses in the last period, faced housing 
price  1 M−   and permanent income  1 Y − , and this generation’s current saving rate is 0, 
in contrast to the model in Table 2. All cohorts proceed in a similar fashion. 
Suppose the laws of motion for permanent income and housing prices are given, 
respectively, by  ( ) 1 1 Y aY ττ − = +   and  ( ) 1 1 M bM ττ − = + , where the growth rates  a 
and  b   are both constant. Under such conditions, the aggregate saving rate is given 
by 





























,  (7) 
which can be simplified to 
























 −+ +  −
−+
=
 −+  +
−+
. 
  It can be shown that the aggregate saving rate under borrowing constraints is 
larger than that without borrowing constraints. The intuition is as follows. Without 
borrowing constraints, when housing prices increase, the average saving rate of 
would-be homebuyers is larger than that of the homeowners because of the population 
effect. With borrowing constraints, this population effect is significantly amplified 
because the saving rate of all homeowners is now zero. In other words, in computing 
the aggregate savings, the population weight of would-be homebuyers is increased 
from  1 T   to  1 t , while the population weight of the homeowners is decreased from 21 
 
1 T   to  0. Because the aggregate income of all cohorts is the same, the ratio of 
aggregate savings to aggregate income (the aggregate saving rate) has increased under 
borrowing constraints. 
  Calibration.  As in the  previous analysis  in Section 2.2,  set  T =  40,  t=  15, 
0 0 MY = 8,  a= 0.13, and  b = 0.09. Substituting these values into equation (7) gives 
an aggregate saving rate of 16.66%. Alternatively, if we allow the growth rate of 
income and housing prices to vary over time (as in actual Chinese data), under the 
assumption of perfect foresight, the aggregate saving rate is given by: 





















.  (8) 
Using the same method adopted in Section 2.2—namely, choosing 2007 as the base 
year for the current homebuyers (cohort  1 t + ), estimating and computing the 
associated values for housing prices { } 10 1 , ,, ,, t t Tt MM M M − − ++    and permanent 
incomes  { } 10 1 , ,,,, t t Tt YY Y Y − − ++  , and substituting the results into equation (8) 
gives an aggregate saving rate of 19.22%, higher than that implied by equation (7). 
Clearly, under severe  borrowing constraints  (i.e.,  no borrowing at all),  using 
actual Chinese time-series data for housing prices and income implies estimates of the 
aggregate saving rate that matches the actual Chinese household saving rate quite well. 
It thus appears that rising housing prices can explain China’s high household saving 
rate if borrowing constraints are taken into account. Or is it so?   
Not really. In reality, the degrees of borrowing constraints are not as severe as 
assumed in the previous analysis. Typically, homebuyers only need to pay one-third of 
the housing price as a down payment and can borrow at least two-thirds with the 
mortgage. The question is, how would a slightly relaxed borrowing constraint affect 
our quantitative result? 
To be conservative, assume that the down-payment requirement is as high as 22 
 
50%  of the house.
14
 
  In this case, the borrowing constraints do not  bind if each 
generation’s optimal time for buying a house is after working for 20 years (because of 
sufficient savings). However, as long as each generation still needs to purchase houses 
after working only for 15 years (as assumed before), borrowing constraints will still 
bind for every generation with an empirically plausible growth rate of income and 
housing prices.  Under these conditions, a typical individual’s saving  behavior  is 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Individual’s Saving Behavior with 50% Down Payment 
Period  1  …  t  t+1  t+2  …  T 
Expenditure  Y Mt −   …  Y Mt −   YM +   Y   …  Y  
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Tt −
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As Table 5 shows, between period 1 and period  t  of an individual’s lifetime, a 
consumer’s annual saving is  2 Mt ; in period  1 t + , the total past savings are just 
enough to pay for the 50% down payment, so the consumer needs to borrow the other 
50% from future income to pay for the mortgage. Thus, in period  1 t +   the buyer’s 






− ; afterward, future saving each 
period is always  ( ) 2
M
Tt − .   
Based on such  information  and assuming  time-varying income and housing 
prices, we can use the methods outlined in the previous sections to compute each 
cohort’s saving rate at the same moment (Table 6). 
 
                                                                 
14  In China the down payment required for home loans has been about one-third of the purchase price until very 
recently. Now the down payment for the first house is one-third and that for the second house is 50%. 23 
 
Table 6. Saving Behavior of Different Cohorts with 50% Down Payment 
Age Cohort  1  …  t  t+1  t+2  …  T 
Permanent 
Income 
t Y   …  1 Y   0 Y   1 Y −   …  1 Tt Y − ++ 
Housing 
Price 
t M   …  1 M   0 M   1 M−   …  1 Tt M− ++ 



























































In Table 6, if permanent income and housing prices follow a constant growth rule, 
( ) 1 1 Y aY ττ − = +   and  ( ) 1 1 M bM ττ − = + , then the aggregate saving rate is given by 


































.  (9) 
In such a case, we use Chinese data to set  T = 40,  t= 15,  0 0 MY = 8,  a=0.13, and 
b = 0.09. Substituting these values into equation (9) gives an aggregate saving rate of 
4.17%.   
On the other hand, if the growth rates of income and housing prices are time 



























.  (10) 
Using the same method as before, by setting 2007 as the base year for homebuyers 
(cohort  1 t + ) and computing the associated housing prices 
{ } 10 1 , ,, ,, t t Tt MM M M − − ++    and permanent incomes { } 10 1 , ,,,, t t Tt YY Y Y − − ++  , 
equation (1) implies an aggregate saving rate of 4.34%. 
Therefore, from the above analyses we can make  the following conclusions: 24 
 
Borrowing constraints can significantly amplify the positive effects of housing prices 
on the aggregate saving rate. However, as long as the borrowing constraints are not 
too severe (i.e., with a 50% down payment),
15
Our analysis also indicates that, relative to rising housing prices and other costs 
of living, borrowing constraints may be a more important and essential factor for 
China’s high household saving rate. This also explains why rising housing prices in 
the United States for more than a decade before the recent financial crisis did not 
induce a high household saving rate: American families are much less borrowing 
constrained than Chinese households. Our conclusion is consistent with the analysis 
of Wen (2009), who shows in a general-equilibrium growth model that borrowing 
constraints not only induce a high precautionary saving rate under income uncertainty 
but also make this precautionary saving rate an increasing function of income growth. 
So a high income growth can lead to a high aggregate saving rate under borrowing 
constraints and income uncertainty. 
  the effects of rising housing prices on 
the aggregate saving rate are minimal. 
3.2   Demographics 
Similar to the cases of income and housing price changes, a changing population 
should have no impact on the aggregate saving rate without borrowing constraints. 
Thus, this section considers only the cases with borrowing constraints. 
If the population changes over time, the population weights  τ α   in equation (3) 
for different cohorts must be adjusted accordingly when computing the aggregate 
saving rate. Thus, letting  Wτ  denote cohort τ ’s share in total population  and 
assuming  that permanent income and housing prices follow the laws of motion, 
( ) 1 1 Y aY ττ − = +   and  ( ) 1 1 M bM ττ − = + , then the  aggregate saving rate  based on 
equation (3) is given by 
                                                                 
15  The actual down-payment requirement in China is less than 50%. Assuming a smaller value further reduces the 
impact of housing prices on aggregate saving rate. 25 
 































,  (11) 
which is analogous to equation (7).   
  Based on the population shares of age 21 to age 60 provided in China Population 
and Employment Statistics Yearbook (2008), assuming that working ages are from 21 
to 60, the average homebuyer’s age is 35 (i.e., he or she must work for 15 years to buy 
a house), using the average income growth and housing price growth in China, 
equation (11) implies an aggregate saving rate of 10.47%, lower than the value under 
constant population. If we allow a 50% down payment for the mortgage, the implied 
aggregate saving rate is negative (-0.75%), also lower than the value with constant 
population. 
If we allow the growth rates of income and housing prices to be time varying, 
under 100% borrowing constraints (100% down payment), the aggregate saving rate 
is given by 






















.  (12) 
Using a similar calibration method as in the previous section by choosing 2007 as the 
base year for the homebuyer cohort, the implied aggregate saving rate is 11.32%, 
lower than the value with constant population. If we allow a 50% down payment, the 
implied aggregate saving rate is -1.62%, also lower than the value with constant 
population. 
The reason that consideration of demographic structure yields a lower aggregate 
saving rate, everything else equal, is that in recent years the homebuyer cohort is at its 
peak in terms of its population share. Therefore, the savings generated by this cohort 
receives larger weight. Figure 3 plots the demographic structure in China based on 
China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook (2008), under the assumption 
that working ages are between 21 and 60 and the average homebuyer’s age is 35. 26 
 
Figure 3 shows that the homebuyer cohort peaked around 2007. 
Suppose the base year of the homebuyer cohort is moved to other years, such as 
2005 or earlier, or if we change the assumed age of homebuyers, the implied 
aggregate saving rate will be only insignificantly different from the value obtained 
earlier under the assumption of constant population. The reason is simple: Unless the 
population has been sharply declining so that the population share of the homebuyer 
cohort is always significantly larger than that of the would-be homebuyer cohorts 
(which is inconsistent with Chinese data), taking the  demographic structure  into 
account cannot strengthen the effect of rising housing prices on the aggregate saving 






























































Figure 3. Population Shares of Different Age Cohorts in 2007 
(Data source: China Statistics Yearbook). 
 
3.3   Summary 
We have discussed three scenarios in the previous analyses: (a) time-varying 
income and housing prices, (b) borrowing constraints, and (c) demographic changes. 27 
 
The results are briefly summarized in Table 7. The first column lists the assumptions, 
the second column shows the corresponding equation used to compute the aggregate 
saving rate, and the last column shows the numerical value of the aggregate saving 
rate. 
 
Table 7. Aggregate Saving Rate under Different Assumptions 
Assumptions  Equation  Saving Rate(%) 
No BC, constant {D, I, P}  （4）  0.00 
No BC, constant D, constant growth in {I, P}  （5）  1.00 
No BC, constant D, time-varying growth in {I,P}  （6）  0.61 
100% BC, constant D, constant growth in {I,P}  （7）  16.66 
100% BC, constant D, time-varying growth in {I,P}  （8）  19.22 
50% BC, constant D, constant growth in {I,P}  （9）  4.17 
50% BC, constant D, time-varying growth in {I,P}  （10）  4.34 
Time-varying D, 100% BC, constant growth in {I,P}  （11）  10.47 
Time-varying D and growth in {I,P}, 100%BC  （12）  11.32 
Time-varying D, 50% BC, constant growth in {I,P}    -0.75 
Time-varying D and growth in {I,P}, 50% BC    -1.62 
Note: BC stands for borrowing constraints, D for population, I for income, P for housing prices, and 
100% BC for full down-payment. 
 
The first three rows in Table 7 show that without borrowing constraints and 
demographic changes, rising housing prices contribute very little to the aggregate 
saving rate:  less than 1%. The subsequent two rows show that under complete 
borrowing constraints (with zero possibility to borrow), rising housing prices can have 
very large effects on aggregate saving rate, ranging from 16.66% to 19.22%. However, 
such effects are quickly dampened once the degree of borrowing constraints is 
reduced. For example, with a 50% down-payment requirement, the aggregate saving 
rate is reduced to 4.17% and 4.34%, respectively, depending on the specific income 
process. In addition, if China’s demographic structure is taken into account, the last 
two rows in the table show that the saving rate is reduced further: down to -0.75% and 
-1.62%, respectively. Therefore, we can conclude that, given Chinese time-series data 
on household income, mortgage prices, borrowing costs, and demographics, the 
aggregate household saving rate is essentially unrelated to housing prices. 28 
 
4  More Sensitivity Analyses 
4.1   Different Extrapolations 
In the previous analyses, we extrapolated the future growth rates of permanent 
income and housing prices beyond 2009 when considering the effects of time-varying 
income and housing prices. For example, in equation (10) we have assumed that 
future growth rates of income and housing prices are both 10% per year after 2009. In 
the following, we conduct sensitivity analyses on equation (10) by considering other 
possible growth rates for future income and housing prices. Assume a 50% down 
payment requirement and that the future growth rates of income and housing prices 
take the values of {8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%}, respectively. The implied aggregate 
saving rates under these possible future growth rates for income and housing prices 
are reported in Table 8, where the top panel assumes a constant demographic structure 
and the bottom panel considers a time-varying population. 
 
Table 8. Sensitivity Analysis for Different Future Growth Rates 
(50% Down Payment) 
  Expected Housing-Price Growth 
  8%  9%  10%  11%  12% 
  Expected Income Growth                  Constant Population 
8%  1.81%  3.24%  4.79%  6.48%  8.34% 
9%  1.73%  3.09%  4.57%  6.19%  7.95% 
10%  1.64%  2.93%  4.34%  5.87%  7.55% 
11%  1.55%  2.77%  4.10%  5.55%  7.13% 
12%  1.46%  2.60%  3.85%  5.22%  6.70% 
                     Time-Varying Population 
8%  -4.44%  -3.16%  -1.77%  -0.25%  1.40% 
9%  -4.26%  -3.04%  -1.70%  -0.24%  1.35% 
10%  -4.07%  -2.90%  -1.62%  -0.23%  1.29% 
11%  -3.87%  -2.76%  -1.55%  -0.22%  1.23% 
12%  -3.67%  -2.61%  -1.46%  -0.21%  1.16% 
 
First, Table 8 shows that, given the growth rate of housing prices, the aggregate 29 
 
saving rate decreases as the growth rate of income rises. This is consistent with the 
permanent-income hypothesis. Second, the aggregate saving rate increases when 
housing prices are growing faster, given the income growth. The main reason for this 
is the existence of borrowing constraints. Third, the aggregate saving rate is the 
highest (as high as 8.34%) when the expected future income growth rate is 8% and 
that of housing prices is 12%. However, if we reduce the down-payment requirement 
from one-half to one-third, the aggregate saving rate becomes essentially zero. Even if 
the down payment remains 50%, taking into account China’s demographic structure 
(lower panel in Table 8) also reduces the implied aggregate saving rate from 8.34% to 
1.40%.   
Therefore, unless people expect housing prices to grow much faster than 12% 
per year, that future income growth is significantly lower than 8% a year, and that the 
borrowing constraints are  more severe than the 50% down-payment requirement, 
housing prices cannot explain China’s high aggregate household saving rate.   
4.2   Other Possible Extensions 
Our analysis so far is based on a simple economic model. However, our simple 
model can be further enriched. In this section we discuss some possible extensions 
and the likely effects of such extensions on our results.   
(a) Making the Timing of Home Purchase Endogenous 
The optimal timing of home purchase  t  in our model is exogenous and is 
calibrated using the average homebuyer’s age (working years). If we can make this 
variable endogenous, the model has the potential to explain the difference in the 
optimal age of homebuyers  across countries. However, even if this variable is 
endogenized, we still need to calibrate the other parameters so that the 
model-predicted timing of home purchase matches that in the data. This is not much 
different from exogenously setting  t= 15, as we did in this paper. Therefore, even if 
t  were endogenous, our results would still hold under similar calibrations. 
(b) Including Wealth Effects   
In our simple model housing is a consumption good and generates a constant 30 
 
lifetime utility. In reality, housing is also a capital good because it may yield capital 
gains when housing prices appreciate, which may generate positive wealth effects. 
However, this simplification does not hurt our analysis. If shelters were introduced 
into our model as a capital good (or durable consumption good), the situation is the 
same for the would-be homebuyer cohorts when housing price increases; but for the 
homeowners, it implies that their wealth would increase, which would decrease their 
saving incentives and mitigate the positive impact of rising housing prices on lifetime 
savings. Such a wealth effect may explain why the aggregate household saving rate in 
developed countries has  been declining  in the past decade. For example, Case, 
Quigley, and Shiller’s (2006)  empirical  analysis based on cross-country and 
cross-state data for the United States finds that for every 10% increase in housing 
prices,  the consumption-to-income ratio increases  by  1.1%  and  the  saving rate 
decreases by 1.1%. These authors explain their findings based on the wealth effect. 
Hence, introducing a wealth effect  into our model would  only strengthen our 
conclusion that rising housing prices cannot explain China’s high aggregate saving 
rate.   
(c) The Hump-Shaped Curve of Lifetime Income 
Our model assumes that household income is either constant or increasing over 
time. But in reality income follows a life cycle with an inverted-U shape: Personal 
income peaks in middle age. However, our results are not sensitive to this income 
pattern. First, in our model the measured income is household or family income, not 
individual income. Household income is less hump-shaped than individual income 
unless both husband and wife are identical wage earners. Second and more 
importantly, the most important concern for a hump-shaped income profile is that 
agents are more borrowing constrained at a young age. But in our model we have set 
the optimal age of home purchase as 35 (i.e., 15 years after start working), which is 
roughly the peak year of lifetime income. Thus, our calibration makes the concern of 
borrowing constraints due to a hump-shaped income pattern less relevant. In addition, 
our calibration of the down-payment requirement of 50% has effectively 
overestimated the actual degree of borrowing constraints; we showed that even under 31 
 
a  50% down-payment requirement the influences of rising housing prices on the 
aggregate saving rate is insignificant. Hence, taking into account the inverted-U curve 
of lifetime income should not change our results significantly.   
(d) Bequests 
In China, many parents give money to their children to buy houses because the 
children cannot afford the high mortgage costs. Hence, a popular view is that this type 
of altruism raised China’s aggregate saving rate. We can use a version of our simple 
model to show that this view is incorrect because it again suffers from the fallacy of 
aggregation. The intuition is simple: Bequests from parents reduce their children’s 
need to save; hence, at the aggregate level bequests have little effect on the average 
household saving rate. 
In particular, under borrowing constraints, bequests can even reduce the positive 
impact of housing prices on the aggregate saving rate when both income and housing 
prices are increasing over time. The reason is as follows. Suppose each generation 
receives a bequest at birth from their  parents and leaves an identical amount of 
bequest at death to their  children.  This chain of overlapping-generation  bequests 
effectively  allows  a consumer  to borrow against future income because bequests 
resemble  lump-sum subsidies when young and lump-sum taxes when old. Hence, 
bequests effectively reduce the borrowing constraints of each generation. So rapidly 
increasing housing prices will have less effect on the aggregate saving rate in an 
economy with bequests. 
5  Conclusions 
Our analysis shows that (i) without borrowing constraints and population growth, 
the aggregate household saving rate is essentially independent of rising housing prices. 
(ii) Accounting for China’s demographic reduces the aggregate saving rate because 
the ratio of homebuyers to non-homebuyers has been increasing, which enlarges the 
weights of the negative savings of the homebuyers in aggregate savings. (iii) Under 
borrowing constraints the aggregate saving rate can become quite sensitive to housing 
prices; however, with realistic degrees of borrowing constraints (such as allowing for 32 
 
a 50% down payment), rising housing prices can generate a aggregate saving rate of 
4.17% without considering the Chinese demographic structure (this value becomes 
zero if the demographic structure is taken into account). These values are too small to 
explain China’s 20% aggregate saving rate. 
Therefore, our analysis clarifies a popular misunderstanding or fallacy that 
attributes the rapidly rising costs of living, such as housing, education, healthcare, and 
so on to China’s high aggregate household saving rate. This view ignores the 
saving-expenditure cancellation effect across cohorts.   
If the rapidly rising housing prices and other costs of living are not responsible 
for the high Chinese saving rate, what are the actual causes of such saving? Our 
analysis of borrowing constraints provides some hint: If people cannot borrow against 
their future income, they must increase their savings when they are young to afford 
the same level of expenditures in the future, which leads to a higher aggregate saving 
rate through the “population effect” that effectively increases the population weights 
of the saving cohorts relative to  the dissaving cohorts  (as if the population were 
growing rapidly). Thus, we believe that future research that takes both borrowing 
constraints and income uncertainty into account may prove fruitful in  explaining 
China’s high aggregate saving rate. Wen  (2009) provides a first step toward  this 
direction.   
Our findings  also have some  policy implications. Although rapidly rising 
housing prices may have adverse welfare effects on would-be homebuyers, policies 
that are designed to reduce housing prices will reduce young people’s individual 
saving rate  but will not be effective in reducing the aggregate saving rate. In 
comparison, policies designed to reduce borrowing constraints and improve  the 
efficiency of the financial system may prove more effective in reducing the aggregate 
saving rate.   
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